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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

--------------------------------------------------------------------T. VAL CHRISTIANSEN
Plaintiff-Appellant
vs.
UTAH-IDAHO SUGAR COMPANY,
a corporation, and UNION
' PACIFIC RAILROAD, a
corporation
Defendants-Respondents
I
I

Case No. 15751

---------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
POINT I
I. THE APPLICABLE STATUTE OF LIMITATION IS 78-12-23(2)AND
; PROVIDES FOR A SIX YEAR STATUTE WHEN ACTION IS BASED UPON AN INSTRUMENT
I IN WRITING.
Defendant-Respondent argues that this action is barred

I

o'

y the t h ree year statute o f

·
'
7 8 -1 2-2 6 .
limita
tions found in

De f en dants '

I argument is extraordinary in light of the circumstances surrounding
' this case.

As previously set forth this action is based upon a Special

Warranty Deed from Defendants to Plaintiffs.

Clearly a warranty deed

is an instrument in writing, thus coming under the six year statute of
limitations.

Defendants' argument that this is an action for breach

of covenants of title and consequently is an action created by the
statutes of this state, coming under 78-12-26(4), providing for a
three year statute of limitation would effectively abrogate the need for
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-2the other more specific statute of limitations provisions found in the
code.

If defendants' argument were adopted, it could be used in numerc.

situations and would effectively circumvent the purpose of having a s:x
year statute of limitations for written documents.
The statute cited by Defendants specifically intends by
its

very wording and plain meaning that it would not apply in this

situation, Section 78-12-26(4) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended,
states that it applies:
"except where in special cases a different
limitation is prescribed by the statutes
of this state."
The case at bar is certainly one of those situations

coming under

78·1.1

the aforementioned exception, because of another statute, to wit:
23(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, has provided for the

actic:I

"special cases" in which written instruments are the basis of an

In addition this Court in Soderberg v. Holt, 8 6 Utah 485,
46P 2d 428(1935), has applied the 6(six) year statute to a claim for
breach of a covenant under a warranty deed.
Plaintiff submits that Defendants cannot seriously argue
before this Court that the 3(three) year statute of limitations is
applicable, in light of the plain clear meaning of the statutes
and a previous

inw~

judicial determination by this court.
POINT II

II. MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT ARE IN DISPUTE AND IT WAS
IMPROPER FOR THE LOWER COURT TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Defendant on page 7 of its
facts in this case are not disputed".

I

brief states, "the material
Defendant on page 3 in his
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statement of facts states:
"On Sepetember 16, 1956, Plaintiff-Appellant
leased from the Los Angeles and Salt Lake Railroa~ a triangular piece of property adjoining the
subJect property on the south. There was attached
to that lease as Exhibit A a plat showing the
property leased. On that plat there is shown a
spur track number 6 which parallels and bounds
the east boundary line of the subject property.
Shown to the west on the plat outline is a
double line in the middle of which appear the
words "spur track (abandoned) . " Since September
16, 1946, up to the present time, PlaintiffAppellant has been aware of the fact that there
was an easement which was designated as abandoned
by the railroad extending through the subject
property.
(Wunderli Affidavit dated January 6,
1968, paragraph 7.) Plaintiff had knowledge at
the time of his purchase that there had been a
spur track located on the property. (Wunderli
Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 11.)

I Defendant uses his interpretation of the facts to support his arguj ment that Plaintiff's claim is barred even if the 6(six) year statute

of limit a t.ions is applicable.

Defendant is thus claiming that Plaintiff

was put on notice of the subject easement either in 1946 or 1956

I
1

(Defendant uses both dates as show in Defendants' s brief as quoted

I

I

above).

Certainly the time that Plaintiff first became aware of a

possible easement which might cloud his title and prevent him from con~ying his property is a "material issue of fact", going to the

question of when the statute of limitations began to run on Plaintiff's
claim.
In Plaintiff's initial brief it is stated in the statement
of facts:
On or about the 13th day of March, 1973, while
Plaintiff-Appellant was attempting to negotiate
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-4the sale or the re-financing of the subject
property, the Plaintiff-Appellant first received
notice that the Defendant, UNION PACIFIC
RAILROAD claimed an interest in the subject
property, to wit: a twenty-five (25) foot rightof-way. Notice was first received by verbal
communication on March 13, 1973 and PlaintiffAppellant was first shown a Plat Map showing
the claimed interest on May 22, 1973.
(Affadavit
of Plaintiff dated August 5, 1977, Pages 1 and
2, Paragraphs 6,7,8 and 11.)

From the statement of facts of both parties used for appe:

it appears clear on its face that a substantial dispute over a rnateri:
issue of fact does exist.

That issue could be stated as:

"When did Plaintiff first receive notice of
a possible defect in his title?"
Plaintiff contends this was in 1973, and Defendants contends this wu
in 1946, or 1956.

Certainly an issue of this magnitude should have

prevented the lower court from granting summary judgment in favor of
Defendants.

Plaintiff reiterates that in a motion for summary judgme:

the factual issues must be considered in a light most favorable to U;
party opposing the motion.

Welchman vs. Wood, 9 Utah 2d 25, 337 P. l

410(1959), Controlled Receivables Inc. vs. Harman, 17 Utah 2d 420, 4:
P. 2d 807 (1966),

Burningham vs. Ott,525 P.2d 620 (1974).

The factual dispute abovementioned, if seen in favor of
Plaintiff, would thus not bar Plaintiff's cause of action based on tr
notion of when Plaintiff first received notice.
Plaintiff submits that numerous spur tracts were previous::
used on the subject property and the specific trackage mentioned by
Defendant in his statement of facts is not even the same trackage whiC"
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!the basis of the .claim upon which this action is based.

The track

i

,mentioned by Defendant is in fact separate, distinct and distinguishable

::ram

that section which is the basis of this action.
A se.cond material issue of fact that is in dispute is

~hether

the easement previously granted by the Defendant prevented

,Plaintiff from selling, conveying, mortgaging or transferring his pro!.lperty consequently damaging him.
j

is

In Plaintiff's statement of facts it

stated:
"The action of the Defendants prevented the Plaintiff
from selling or re-financing the subject property due
to the fact that no buyer or lender was willing to buy
or re-finance this property because of the claimed
right-of-way. As a direct result of these events,
Plaintiff-Appellant was evicted from the property
in a foreclosure action and was undable to redeem
the property."

!tjPlaintiff has stated that the facts will show that he was in fact
evicted from his property as a direct result of actions of the

:::

,Defendant, in conveying a right-of-way which directly would go through

)·

· 1

Plaintiff's building on the premesis.
Defendants contend however, as stated in their statement of
facts:

'I

I

"In 1970 and 1971 Plaintiff-Appellant suffered a
major setback in tlte operation of ~i7 business.du~
to the theft of equipment.
(Deposition of Plainti~f
dated March 14, 1977, p. 32, lines 21 an~ 22.) This
led to the failure of his business, and in the.years
1971 through 1975, Plaintiff-Appellant had no income.
(Deposition of Plaintiff dated March 14, 1977, P·
32 lines 12-20.)"
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-6"Due to the failure of his business, Plaintiff
was unable to make the mortgage payments on the
subject property (Wunderli Affidavit dated January
6, 1978, paragraph 12), and on March 10, 1975,
Dean Terry and Vilate Terry, holders of the
mortgage, obtained a judgment and decree of foreclosure of the mortgage.
The property was sold
at public auction and the Plaintiff-Appellant
failed to redeem the property.
(Wunderli
Affidavit dated January 6, 1978, paragraph 10.)"

Defendants position seems to be that it was in fact not:

subject easement that caused Plaintiff to forfeit the property in que;because of the unwillingness of both buyers and lending institutions
to deal with property that might have a defective title, but that
business setbacks were the cause of Plaintiff's lo sing the property.
Plaintiff's position as set forth above is in direct opposition
Certainly, this is a material issue of fact.

to~

Plaintiff

should be allowed to present evidence as to why he lost the subject
property.

It was improper for the district court to grant summary

judgment in favor of the Defendants in light of these material issues
of fact, still in dispute, and which certainly could be outcome deter
minitive.
POINT III
I I I . THE COVENANT IN QUESTION IN THIS CASE '.'7AS, HO MAT'
HOW DESIGNATED, A COVENANT THAT "RUNS WITH THE LAND" AND IS NOT BREA(
UNTIL PLAINTIFF WAS PUT ON NOTICE AND HARMED THEREBY.
As Plaintiff has previously stated, a covenent of this
nature, and the breach thereof could be characterized as any one
of the following:
(1)

Quiet Enjoyment
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(2)

Encumbrances

(3)

General Warranty

Defendants argu ment concerning

the law surrounding a

covenant of "seisin" is misplaced and not applicable in the case now
before the court.

Plaintiff submits that the Defendant was seised of

the property in question and both sides have agreed that Defendant
did in fact own the land which they conveyed to Plaintiff.

I f in fact

the covenant of seisin is breached at the time of conveyance, that has
no effect at all on the present case, because we are not dealing with
the breach of the covenant of seisin.
three covenants as specified above.

We are dealing with the (3)
The following cases cited

by

Defendant are thus not related to the issue before the Court:
Creason vs. Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P. 2d 403 (1970); Bernklau
v. Stephens, 150 Colo. 187, 371 p. 2d 765 (1962); Anderson vs. Larson,
177 Minn.

606, 225 N.W. 902(1929); Faller vs. Davis, 30 Okl. 56, 118

P. 382 (1911).

Plaintiff also points out that with the exception of

the Creason case which merely states the majority rule, these cases
come from other jurisdictions and are not binding on this court.
Plaintiff submits that Utah has always taken a unique stand in regard
to covenants in order to protect a remote grantee·
If the easement in question in this case is seen as either
a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment or the covenant of general
warranty, the Defendant cannot seriously argue that it does not,
"run with the land".

This court has previously decided that they
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-8do in fact run.

Van Cott vs. Jacklin, 63 C

412, 226 P460(1924);

East Canyon Land and Stock Company vs Davis and Weber Counties Canal
Company,

65u 560, 238 P280(1925).
It appears that the only basis that Defandant has to

contend that this covenant does not run with the land, is to character·
ize this as a covenant against encumbrances.

In Plaintiff's initial

brief, he outlined the specific law in Utah surrounding a breach of th;
covenant against encumbrances.

The case used by both sides on this

issue isrof course, Soderberg vs Holt, 86 u 485, 46 P 2d 428

(1935).

Defendants attempt to distinguish this case due to the fact that the
Soderberg case involved a money charge and not an easement.
attempted distinction is invalid.

Soderberg

This

does an excellent job

analyzing the law of the various states on this issue, and deals
with much more than strictly the opinion by Judge Cooley in Post v.
Campau, Liz Mich 90, 3 N.W. 272,

(1879).

The court then makes the gen1

holding as Plaintiff has previously cited (p.6 of initial brief).
The Court decided that the logical fabric of the law and equity would
be better served to hold that a covenant against encumbrances does
run with the land and thus a claim by a remote grantee is not barred
with a valid claim.

In addition, this court has further stressed

that the true nature of the covenant against encumbrances is a covenant
to indemnify.

Pacific Bond and Mortgage Company vs. Ruhn,101 U 335,

121P.2 635 (1942).
If this Court were to adopt Defendants' argument it would
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lin

effect prevent a remote grantee that had no notice of an encumbrance

1from processing his claim against a grantor that had encumbered

the

[transferred proT_:Jer ly. Plaintiff submits that this court should adopt
] the position that a covenant against encumbrances runs with the land .
.1

I

The District Court erred in granting summary judgment on
this issue, due to the fact that the holding of the court is against the

,;I law in the State of Utah.

PART IV
IV. DEFENDANT GRANTED THE EASEMENT IN QUESTION PRIOR TO
DEFENDANT'S CONVEYANCE TO PLAINTIFF AND SHOULD BE HELD TO THE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTS .
Defendants argue that since this claim did not come to light
!

until after their conveyance to Plaintiff, they should not be held

I

' liable under the implied covenants of a Special Warranty Deed.

Plaintiff

I

I

! fails to comprehend how the Defendant can come before this Court and

I~
1

argue, that even though they had conveyed this easement, resulting

1

] in a defect in Plaintiff's title to the subject property, they should

I not be held liable for these acts because they were prior to the
~nveyance

to Plaintiff.

(p. 16 of Defendants' brief.) The whole

I purpose of implying covenants in a deed is to protect a grantee from
I

acts done by a grantor.

Certainly, the Defendant should be held

1

t

liable.
I

Defendant , not a third party, made the conveyances which

Plaintiff has alleged resulted in damage to him.

For the Court to

I

·adopt Defendants' argument would abrogate the purpose of implied covenants
au together.
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-10CONCLUSION
The summary judgment should be reversed.
of fact remain.
claim.

Material issues

There is no statute of limitations bar to Plaintiff's I

An eviction took place giving rise to Plaintiff's claim.

Defendants have effectively conceeded that the Marketable Record Title

I

Act is not a bar to Plaintiff's claim.

Re~ectfully Submitted,

7.rL~ Mf;,E~N~

I

I

I

Cohne, Rappaport & Segal
.
66 Exchange Place
I
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
'
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellan~

I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct
copy of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant to
McKay, Burton, Thurr.ian & Condie, Attorneys for DefendantsRe •ponden t., 5 0 O Kennecott Bu~ salt Lal'e city, u tah

thi• 5th day of January,

1979.~

!!! .

.

!Y1~
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